.svg)
.svg)
An Underrated Technique to Delete Volume Shadow Copies - DeviceIoControl
Picus Labs has updated the Picus Threat Library with a relatively new method used by attackers to delete Volume Shadow Copies.
To prevent the recovery of a corrupted system, adversaries delete built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to help recover, and this adversary behavior is listed as the T1490 Inhibit System Recovery technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Impact tactic [1].
One of the most used methods to implement this technique is deleting volume shadow copies; a typical ransomware behavior used to prevent the recovery of encrypted files from volume shadow copies.
Start your 14-day Free Trial: Simulate MITRE ATT&CK Techniques in minutes
Adversaries use various procedures to delete volume shadow copies. The well-known methods are:
1. wmic: wmic.exe is a command-line utility to access Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), which is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows-based operating systems. You can write WMI scripts or applications to automate administrative tasks on remote computers. Ransomware threat actors like Nefilim use a simple WMIC command to delete shadow copies [2]:
|
wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive |
Picus Threat Library includes following actions that simulates this adversary technique:
|
Action ID |
Action Name |
|
12875 |
Delete Shadow Copy via WMI Objects |
|
5299032 |
Delete Shadow Copy using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Variant-1 |
|
11269 |
Delete Shadow Copy using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Variant-2 |
This method is also a part of the following attack scenarios in the Picus Threat Library:
|
Threat ID |
Threat Name |
|
46783 |
Inhibit System Recovery Micro Emulation Plan |
|
75742 |
BlackCat Ransomware Campaign 2022 |
|
87523 |
BlackByte Ransomware Campaign 2021 |
|
25731 |
Maze Ransomware Campaign 2020 |
|
62932 |
Trickbot Malware Campaign 2020 |
|
68631 |
BlackMatter Ransomware Campaign 2021 |
|
vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet |
Start your 14-day Free Trial: Simulate MITRE ATT&CK Techniques in minutes
Picus Threat Library includes following actions that simulates this adversary technique:
|
Action ID |
Action Name |
|
5249653 |
Delete All Shadow Copies by using Vssadmin Variant-1 |
|
11268 |
Delete All Shadow Copies by using Vssadmin Variant-2 |
|
5227760 |
Delete Shadow Copy by using Vssadmin Variant-1 |
|
12192 |
Delete Shadow Copy by using Vssadmin Variant-2 |
This method is also a part of the following attack scenarios in the Picus Threat Library:
|
Threat ID |
Threat Name |
|
46783 |
Inhibit System Recovery Micro Emulation Plan |
|
75742 |
BlackCat Ransomware Campaign 2022 |
|
44608 |
Diavol Ransomware Campaign 2021 |
|
49620 |
Netwalker Ransomware Covid19 Themed Malware Campaign 2020 |
|
45601 |
CoronaVirus Ransomware Campaign 2020 |
|
83153 |
Ragnar Locker Ransomware Campaign 2020 |
|
62932 |
Trickbot Malware Campaign 2020 |
3. PowerShell is also capable of deleting volume shadow copies via VMI. PowerShell’s Get-WmiObject cmdlet can access WMI access and runs WMI’s Win32_ShadowCopy class to delete volume shadow copies. For example, the NetWalker ransomware use the following PowerShell command to inhibit system recovery:
|
Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();} |
Picus Threat Library includes following actions that simulates this adversary technique:
|
Action ID |
Action Name |
|
5266360 |
Delete Shadow Copy using Powershell |
This method is also a part of the following attack scenarios in the Picus Threat Library:
|
Threat ID |
Threat Name |
|
46783 |
Inhibit System Recovery Micro Emulation Plan |
|
63628 |
Darkside Ransomware Campaign 2021 |
|
49621 |
Netwalker Ransomware Malware Campaign 2020 |
4. A relatively new method used by attackers to inhibit Volume Shadow Copies from being used for system recovery is resizing the maximum amount of storage space that can be used for shadow copy storage. Using this method, adversaries decrease the allocated storage for snapshots of Volume Shadow Copies; the minimum possible size is 320MB. If the existing snapshots exceed the size of the newly resized diff area, they are deleted by the system to free up space, so this feature can also be used to delete existing snapshots of volume shadow copies.
vssadmin can be used to resize shadow copy storage. For example, the Hakbit ransomware uses the following command to resize the allocated space for shadow copies as 401 MB:
|
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB |
Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) relies on a device driver waiting for control codes. Another method to resize the shadow storage is directly accessing this driver by using the device IO control calls to the driver. DeviceIoControl() function can be used for this method. The control call that is used to resize the storage size is IOCTL_VOLSNAP_SET_MAX_DIFF_AREA_SIZE. The hex value of this control code is 0x53c028, which means the device type is 0x53, the function code is 0xa, the method is 0x0 METHOD_BUFFERED, and the access is Read and Write.
Adversaries realized that this control call is capable of setting a maximum storage size for Volume Shadow Copy snapshots and started to use it in their malware. Picus Labs’ Red Team updated Picus Threat Library for that direct device access method to delete volume shadow copies.
Picus Threat Library includes following actions that simulates this adversary technique:
|
Action ID |
Action Name |
|
12607 |
Delete Shadow Copy using DeviceIoControl |
This method is also a part of the following attack scenarios in the Picus Threat Library:
|
Threat ID |
Threat Name |
|
46783 |
Inhibit System Recovery Micro Emulation Plan |
References
[1] https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
[2] https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-beat-nefilim-ransomware-attacks
Share this:
